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Abstract. We consider all LWE- and NTRU-based encryption, key en-
capsulation, and digital signature schemes proposed for standardisation
as part of the Post-Quantum Cryptography process run by the US Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In particular, we
investigate the impact that different estimates for the asymptotic run-
time of (block-wise) lattice reduction have on the predicted security of
these schemes. Relying on the “LWE estimator” of Albrecht et al., we
estimate the cost of running primal and dual lattice attacks against
every LWE-based scheme, using every cost model proposed as part of
a submission. Furthermore, we estimate the security of the proposed
NTRU-based schemes against the primal attack under all cost models for
lattice reduction.
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1 Introduction
In 2015, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began a
process aimed at standardising post-quantum Public-Key Encryption schemes
(PKE), Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM), and Digital Signature Algorithms
(SIG), resulting in a call for proposals in 2016 [Nat16]. The aim of this standard-
isation process is to meet the cryptographic requirements for communication
(e.g. via the Internet) in an era where quantum computers exist. Participants
were invited to submit their designs, along with different parameter sets aimed
at meeting one or more target security categories (out of a pool of 5). These
categories roughly indicate how classical and quantum attacks on the proposed
schemes compare to attacks on AES and SHA-3 in the post-quantum context.
As part of their submissions participants were asked to provide cryptanalysis
supporting their security claims, and to use this cryptanalysis to roughly estimate
the size of the security parameter for each parameter set.
Out of the 69 “complete and proper” submissions received by NIST, 23 are based
on either the LWE or the NTRU family of lattice problems. Whilst techniques
for solving these problems are well known, there exist different schools of thought
regarding the asymptotic cost of these techniques, and more specifically, of the
BKZ lattice reduction algorithm. This algorithm, which combines SVP calls in
projected sub-lattices or “blocks”, is a vital building block in attacks on these
schemes. These differences can result in the same scheme being attributed several
different security levels, and hence security categories, depending on the cost model
being used. By “cost model” we mean the combination of the cost of solving SVP
in dimension β and the number of SVP oracle calls required by BKZ (cf. Section 4).
A major source of divergence in estimated security is whether current estimates
for sieving [AKS01,LMvdP15,BDGL16] or enumeration [Kan83,FP85,MW15] are
used to instantiate the SVP oracle in BKZ; we refer to the former as the “sieving
regime” and the latter as the “enumeration regime”. A second source of divergence
is how polynomial factors are treated.
Thus, to provide a clearer view of the effect of the chosen cost model on the
security assurances given by each submission, we extract the proposed parameter
sets for each LWE-based and NTRU-based submission (Section 3). In particular,
we consider each LWE-based scheme as a plain LWE instance, i.e. we mention
algebraic (ring, module) structure but do not consider it further in our analysis,
as is standard. We also extract the cost models used to analyse them (Section 4).
Using this information, we then cross-estimate the security of each parameter set
under every cost model from every submission (Section 5).
In this work, we restrict our attention to a subset of attacks on both families of
problems. For LWE, we restrict our attention to the uSVP variant of the primal
lattice attack as given in [BG14,ADPS16,AGVW17] and the dual lattice attack as
given in [MR09,Alb17]. We disregard combinatorial [AFFP14,GJS15,KF15,GJMS17]
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and algebraic attacks [AG11,ACFP14], since those algorithms are not competitive
for the parameter sets considered here in the sieving regime.4 Furthermore, we
only consider the different cost models proposed in each submission and leave
the consideration of variants of the dual and primal attack proposed in several
submissions for future work. For the primal attack this, in particular, means that
we do not consider the primal attack via a combination of lattice reduction and
BDD enumeration often referred to as a “lattice decoding” attack. While the
primal uSVP attack can be considered as a simplified variant of the decoding
attack in the enumeration regime, it typically outperforms the latter in the
sieving regime. We intend to extend our analysis to the decoding attack in future
work. For NTRU, we restrict our attention to the primal uSVP attack (possibly)
combined with guessing zero-entries of the short vector, which can be considered
as a simplified variant of the hybrid attack [HG07,Wun16]. In particular, we do
not consider the meet-in-the-middle variant or “guessing + nearest plane” after
lattice reduction. Again, we intend to extend our analysis to cover the full hybrid
attack in future work.
Related Work. NIST categorised each scheme according to the family of
underlying problem (lattice-based, code-based, SIDH-based, MQ-based, hash-
based, other) in [Moo17]. This analysis was refined in [Fuj17]. NIST then provided
a first performance comparison of all complete and proper schemes in [Nat17].
Bernstein provided a comparison of all schemes based on the sizes of their
ciphertexts and keys in [Ber17].
2 Preliminaries
We write vectors in lowercase bold letters v and matrices in capital bold letters A,
and refer to their entries with a subscript index vi, Ai,j . We identify polynomials
f of degree n− 1 with their corresponding coefficient vector f . We write ‖f‖ to
mean the Euclidean norm of f . Inner products are written using angular brackets
〈v,w〉. The transpose of v is indicated as vt. Generic probability distributions are
labelled χ. We use the notation a← χ to indicate that a is an element sampled
from χ. We refer to the expectation of a as Eχ[a], and its variance as Vχ[a] and
we may omit the subscript χ if the distribution is clear from the context. For
c ∈ Q, we use bce to denote the procedure of rounding c to the nearest integer
z ∈ Z, rounding towards zero in the case of a tie.
We write US to mean the discrete uniform distribution over S ∩ Z. If S = [a, b],
we refer to U[a,b] as a bounded uniform distribution. We write the distribution of
4 BKW-style algorithms do outperform BKZ in the enumeration regime for some
medium-sized parameter sets, but require an exponential number of samples, which
will not be available to an adversary attacking any of the discussed schemes. Further-
more, similarly to BKZ in the sieving regime, BKW requires 2Θ(n) memory.
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s such that si ← U[a,b] as (a, b), and the distribution of s such that exactly h
entries (selected at uniform) have been sampled from U[a,b]\{0}, and the remaining
entries have been set to 0, as ((a, b), h).
An n-dimensional lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. Every n-dimensional
lattice L can be represented by a basis, i.e. a set of linearly independent vectors
B = {b1, . . . , bm} such that L = Zb1 + · · ·+ Zbm. If n = m, the lattice is called
a full-rank lattice. Let L be a lattice and B be a basis of L, in which case we
write L = L(B). Then the volume (also called covolume or determinant) of L is
an invariant of the lattice and is defined as Vol(L) =
√
det(BtB). In a random
lattice, the Gaussian heuristic estimates the length of a shortest non-zero vector










The quality of a lattice basis B = {b1, . . . , bm} of a full-rank lattice L such that
‖b1‖ ≤ ‖b2‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖bm‖ can be measured by its root Hermite factor δ defined
via ‖b1‖ = δmVol(L)1/m. If the basis B is BKZ reduced with block size β we







In this work, we are concerned with schemes whose security is based on either
the LWE or the NTRU assumption.
2.1 LWE
Definition 1 (LWE [Reg05]). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability
distribution on Z and s be a secret vector in Znq . We denote the LWE Distribution
Ls,χ,q as the distribution on Znq × Zq given by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at
random, choosing e ∈ Z according to χ and considering it as an element of Zq,
and outputting (a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
Decision-LWE is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, bi)}mi=1 are
drawn from the LWE distribution Ls,χ,q or uniformly from Znq × Zq.
Search-LWE is the problem of recovering the vector s from a collection {(ai, bi)}mi=1
of samples drawn according to Ls,χ,q.
As originally defined in [Reg05], χ is a rounded Gaussian distribution, however
LWE is typically defined with a discrete Gaussian distribution [LP11]. It was
later shown that the secret can also be drawn from the error distribution without
any loss in security [ACPS09]. This variant is known as the “normal form”. Many
submissions consider alternative distributions for sampling errors and secrets
such as small uniform, sparse or binomial distributions.
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The primal-uSVP attack solves the Search-LWE problem by constructing an
integer embedding lattice (using either the Kannan [Kan87] or Bai and Gal-
braith [BG14] embedding), and solving the unique Shortest Vector Problem
(uSVP). The dual attack solves Decision-LWE by reducing it to the Short Integer
Solution Problem (SIS) [Ajt96], which in turn is reduced to finding short vec-
tors in the lattice {x ∈ Zmq | xtA ≡ 0 mod q}. For either attack, variants are
known which exploit the presence of unusually short, or sparse, secret distribu-
tions [BG14,CHK+17,Alb17] and we consider these variants in this work where
applicable.
Related problems. Expanding on the idea of LWE, related problems with a sim-
ilar structure have been proposed. In particular, in the Ring-LWE [SSTX09,LPR10]
problem polynomials s, ai and ei (s and ei are “short”) are drawn from a ring of
the form Rq = Zq[x]/(φ) for some polynomial φ of degree n. Then, given a list of
Ring-LWE samples {(ai, ai · s+ ei)}mi=1, the Search-RLWE problem is to recover
s and the Decision-RLWE problem is to distinguish the list of samples from a list
uniformly sampled from Rq ×Rq. More generally, in the Module-LWE [LS15]
problem vectors (of polynomials) ai, s and polynomials ei are drawn from Rkq
and Rq respectively. Search-MLWE is the problem of recovering s from a set
{(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei)}mi=1, Decision-MLWE is the problem of distinguishing such a
set from a set uniformly sampled from Rkq ×Rq.
One can view RLWE and MLWE instances as LWE instances by interpreting
the coefficients of elements in Rq as vectors in Znq and ignoring the algebraic
structure of Rq. This identification with LWE is the standard approach to costing
the complexity of solving RLWE and MLWE due to the absence of known
cryptanalytic techniques exploiting algebraic structure. Therefore, we restrict our
analysis of solving RLWE and MLWE to the primal and dual attacks mentioned
above.
There is also a class of LWE-like problems that replace the addition of a noise
term by a deterministic rounding process. For example, an instance of the learning
with rounding (LWR) problem is of the form
(
a, b := bpq 〈a, s〉e
)
∈ Znq × Zp. We
interpret this as a LWE instance by multiplying the second component by q/p
and assuming that q/p · b = 〈a, s〉 + e where e is uniform over the interval
(−q/2p, q/2p] [BPR12]. The resulting variance of this error term can then be
calculated as q2/(12p2). The same ideas apply to the other variants of LWE that
use deterministic rounding error, such as RLWR and MLWR.
Number of samples. LWE as defined in Definition 1 provides the adversary
with an arbitrary number of samples. However, this does not hold true for any of
the schemes considered in this work. In particular, in the RLWE KEM setting –
which is the most common for the schemes considered here – the public key is one
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RLWE sample (a, b) = (a, a · s+ e) for some short s, e and encapsulations consist
of two RLWE samples v · a + e′ and v · b + e′′ + m˜ where m˜ is some encoding
of a random string and v, e′, e′′ are short. Thus, depending on the target, the
adversary is given either n or 2n plain LWE samples. In a typical setting, though,
the adversary does not get to enjoy the full power of having two samples at its
disposal, because, firstly, the random string m˜ increases the noise in v · b+ e′′+ m˜
by a factor of 2 and, secondly, because many schemes drop lower order bits from
v · b + e′′ + m˜ to save bandwidth. Due to the way decryption works this bit
dropping can be quite aggressive, and thus the noise in the second sample can
be quite large. In the case of Module-LWE, a ciphertext in transit produces a
smaller number of LWE samples, but n samples can still be recovered from the
public key. In this work, we consider the n and 2n scenarios for all schemes and
leave distinguishing which scenario applies to which scheme for future work. We
note that, for many schemes, n samples are sufficient to run the most efficient
variant of either attack.
2.2 NTRU
Definition 2 (NTRU [HPS96]). Let n, q be positive integers, φ ∈ Z[x] be a
monic polynomial of degree n, and Rq = Zq[x]/(φ). Let f ∈ R×q , g ∈ Rq be small
polynomials (i.e. having small coefficients) and h = g · f−1 mod q. Search-NTRU
is the problem of recovering f or g given h.
Remark 1. One can exchange the roles of f and g (in the case that g is invertible)
by replacing h with h−1 = f · g−1 mod q, if this leads to a better attack.
The most common ways to choose the polynomial f (or g) are the following.
The first is to choose f to have small coefficients (e.g. ternary). The second is
to choose F to have small coefficients (e.g. ternary) and to set f = pF for some
(small) prime p. The third is to choose F to have small coefficients (e.g. ternary)
and to set f = pF + 1 for some (small) prime p.
The NTRU problem can be reduced to solving uSVP in the NTRU lattice L(B)







where H is the “rotation matrix” of h, see for example [CS97,HPS98]. Indeed,
L(B) contains the short vector (f | g)t, since hf = g mod q and hence (f | g)t =
B(w | g)t for some w ∈ Zn. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the vector
(f | g)t (or a rotation of) is the unique shortest vector in L(B). In addition, if
f = pF or f = pF + 1 for some small polynomial F then one can construct
a similar uSVP lattice that contains (F , g)t, see for example [Sch15,Wun16].
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Similar to LWE, in order to improve this attack, rescaling and dimension reducing
techniques can be applied [MS01]. Note that the dimension of the lattice must be
between n and 2n by construction. Using such a dimension reducing technique
means the primal uSVP attack can be seen as a simplified version of a hybrid
attack [HG07,GvVW17,Wun16], where only zeros are guessed. In this work,
only this simple version is considered since it can be readily costed using the
[APS15] estimator. The dual attack is not considered, as it does not apply.
2.3 Lattice reduction
The techniques outlined above to solve the LWE and NTRU problems rely on
lattice reduction, the procedure of generating a “sufficiently orthogonal” basis
given the description of a lattice. The lattice reduction algorithm attaining the
best theoretical results is Slide reduction [GN08]. In this work, however, we
consider the experimentally best performing algorithm, BKZ [SE94,CN11,DT17].
Given a basis for one of the lattices described above, we need to choose the block
size necessary to successfully recover the shortest vector when running BKZ. This
is done following the analysis introduced in [ADPS16, Section 6.3] for the LWE
and NTRU primal attacks, and the analysis done in [MR09,Alb17] for the LWE
dual attack.
BKZ in turn makes use of an oracle solving the Shortest Vector Problem (or
SVP oracle) in a smaller lattice. Several SVP algorithms can be used to in-
stantiate this oracle, the two most efficient are current generations of siev-
ing [BDGL16] or enumeration [MW15]. Since we are considering security in the
post-quantum setting, we also have to consider quantum algorithms, which as of
writing mainly means to consider potential Grover [Gro96] speed-ups for these
algorithms [LMvdP15,ADPS16]. We note that the reported speed-ups of these
algorithms are assuming perfect quantum computers that can run arbitrarily
long computations and disregard the inherent lack of parallelism in Grover-style
search. A more refined understanding of the cost of quantum algorithms for
solving SVP is a pressing topic for future research.
3 Proposed schemes
The three tables below specify the parameter sets for the schemes considered. In
particular Table 1 gives the parameters for the NTRU-based schemes. Table 2
gives the parameters of the same schemes when converted into the LWE-based
context, as detailed in Section 5. Finally, Table 3 gives the parameters for the
LWE-based schemes in terms of plain LWE, that is, ignoring the potential ring
or module structure.
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Throughout, n is the dimension of the problem and q the modulus. The polynomial
φ, if present, is the polynomial considered to form the ring from which LWE or
NTRU elements are drawn. In particular, this ring is Rq = Zq[x]/(φ), that is,
degree n polynomials with coefficients from the integers modulo q quotiented by
the ideal generated by φ.
In Tables 2 and 3, the value σ is the standard deviation of the distribution χ
from which the errors are drawn. This error distribution is not always Gaussian,
and our approaches to such cases are explained in Section 5. Note that often
in lattice based cryptography the notation DΛ,s,c is used to denote a discrete
Gaussian with support the lattice Λ, s a “standard deviation parameter” and c
a centre. In this work σ is the standard deviation, explicitly σ = s/
√
2pi. If the
secret distribution is “normal”, i.e. in the normal form, this means it is the same
distribution as the error, namely χ. If not, the distribution given determines the
secret distribution.
Name n q ‖f‖ ‖g‖ NIST Assumption φ Primitive
NTRUEncrypt 443 2048 16.94 16.94 1 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
743 2048 22.25 22.25 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
1024 1073750017 23168.00 23168.00 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
Falcon 512 12289 91.71 91.71 1 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
768 18433 112.32 112.32 2, 3 NTRU xn − xn/2 + 1 SIG
1024 12289 91.71 91.71 4, 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG




NTRU Prime 761 4591 16.91 22.52 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
761 4591 15.81 22.52 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
pqNTRUsign 1024 65537 22.38 22.38 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 SIG
Table 1: Parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes with secret dimension n, modulo
q, small polynomials f and g, and ring Zq [x]/(φ). The NIST column indicates the
NIST security category aimed at.
Name n q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
NTRUEncrypt 443 2048 0.80 ((−1, 1), 287) 1 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
743 2048 0.82 ((−1, 1), 495) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
1024 1073750017 724.00 normal 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 KEM, PKE
Falcon 512 12289 4.05 normal 1 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
768 18433 4.05 normal 2, 3 NTRU xn − xn/2 + 1 SIG
1024 12289 2.87 normal 4, 5 NTRU xn + 1 SIG
NTRU HRSS 700 8192 0.79 ((−1, 1), 437) 1 NTRU ∑n−1i=0 xi KEM
NTRU Prime 761 4591 0.82 ((−1, 1), 286) 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
761 4591 0.82 ((−1, 1), 250) 5 NTRU xn − x− 1 KEM
pqNTRUsign 1024 65537 0.70 ((−1, 1), 501) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 NTRU xn − 1 SIG
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Name n q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
Table 2: LWE parameter sets for NTRU-based schemes, with dimension n, modulo q,
standard deviation of the error σ, and ring Zq [x]/(φ). The parameters are obtained
following Section 5. The NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed
at.
Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
KCL-RLWE 1024 — 12289 2.83 normal 5 RLWE xn + 1 KEM
KCL-MLWE 768 3 7681 1.00 normal 4 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM
768 3 7681 2.24 normal 4 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM
BabyBear 624 2 1024 1.00 normal 2 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
624 2 1024 0.79 normal 2 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
MamaBear 936 3 1024 0.94 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
936 3 1024 0.71 normal 4 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
PapaBear 1248 4 1024 0.87 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
1248 4 1024 0.61 normal 5 ILWE qn/k − qn/(2k) − 1 KEM
CRYSTALS-Dilithium 768 3 8380417 3.74 (−6, 6) 1 MLWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1024 4 8380417 3.16 (−5, 5) 2 MLWE xn/k + 1 SIG
1280 5 8380417 2.00 (−3, 3) 3 MLWE xn/k + 1 SIG
CRYSTALS-Kyber 512 2 7681 1.58 normal 1 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
768 3 7681 1.41 normal 3 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 4 7681 1.22 normal 5 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Ding Key Exchange 512 — 120883 4.19 normal 1 RLWE xn + 1 KEM
1024 — 120883 2.60 normal 3, 5 RLWE xn + 1 KEM
EMBLEM 770 — 16777216 25.00 (−1, 1) 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
611 — 16777216 25.00 (−2, 2) 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
R EMBLEM 512 — 65536 25.00 (−1, 1) 1 RLWE xn + 1 † KEM, PKE
512 — 16384 3.00 (−1, 1) 1 RLWE xn + 1 † KEM, PKE
Frodo 640 — 32768 2.75 normal 1 LWE — KEM, PKE
976 — 65536 2.30 normal 3 LWE — KEM, PKE
NewHope 512 — 12289 2.00 normal 1 RLWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 — 12289 2.00 normal 5 RLWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
HILA5 1024 — 12289 2.83 normal 5 RLWE xn + 1 KE
KINDI 768 3 16384 2.29 (−4, 4) 2 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 2 8192 1.12 (−2, 2) 4 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 2 16384 2.29 (−4, 4) 4 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1280 5 16384 1.12 (−2, 2) 5 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
1536 3 8192 1.12 (−2, 2) 5 MLWE xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
LAC 512 — 251 0.71 normal 1, 2 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
1024 — 251 0.50 normal 3, 4 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
1024 — 251 0.71 normal 5 PLWE xn + 1 KE, KEM, PKE
LIMA-2p 1024 — 133121 3.16 normal 3 RLWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 184321 3.16 normal 4 RLWE xn + 1 KEM, PKE
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
















Lizard 536 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 140) 1 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
663 — 1024 1.15 ((−1, 1), 128) 1 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
816 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 200) 3 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
952 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 200) 3 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
1088 — 4096 1.15 ((−1, 1), 200) 5 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
1300 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 200) 5 LWE, LWR — KEM, PKE
RLizard 1024 — 1024 1.15 ((−1, 1), 128) 1 RLWE, RLWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
1024 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 264) 3 RLWE, RLWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 2048 1.15 ((−1, 1), 164) 3 RLWE, RLWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
2048 — 4096 1.15 ((−1, 1), 256) 5 RLWE, RLWR xn + 1 KEM, PKE
LOTUS 576 — 8192 3.00 normal 1, 2 LWE — KEM, PKE
704 — 8192 3.00 normal 3, 4 LWE — KEM, PKE
832 — 8192 3.00 normal 5 LWE — KEM, PKE
uRound2.KEM 500 — 16384 2.31 ((−1, 1), 74) 1 LWR — KEM
580 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 116) 2 LWR — KEM
630 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 126) 3 LWR — KEM
786 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 156) 4 LWR — KEM
786 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 156) 5 LWR — KEM
uRound2.KEM 418 — 4096 4.62 ((−1, 1), 66) 1 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
522 — 32768 36.95 ((−1, 1), 78) 2 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
540 — 16384 18.48 ((−1, 1), 96) 3 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
700 — 32768 36.95 ((−1, 1), 112) 4 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
676 — 32768 36.95 ((−1, 1), 120) 5 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
uRound2.PKE 500 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 74) 1 LWR — PKE
585 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 110) 2 LWR — PKE
643 — 32768 4.62 ((−1, 1), 114) 3 LWR — PKE
835 — 32768 2.31 ((−1, 1), 166) 4 LWR — PKE
835 — 32768 2.31 ((−1, 1), 166) 5 LWR — PKE
uRound2.PKE 420 — 1024 1.15 ((−1, 1), 62) 1 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
540 — 8192 4.62 ((−1, 1), 96) 2 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
586 — 8192 4.62 ((−1, 1), 104) 3 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
708 — 32768 18.48 ((−1, 1), 140) 4, 5 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
nRound2.KEM 400 — 3209 3.62 ((−1, 1), 72) 1 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
486 — 1949 2.20 ((−1, 1), 96) 2 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
556 — 3343 3.77 ((−1, 1), 88) 3 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
658 — 1319 1.49 ((−1, 1), 130) 4, 5 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi KEM
nRound2.PKE 442 — 2659 1.50 ((−1, 1), 74) 1 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
556 — 3343 1.88 ((−1, 1), 88) 2 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
576 — 2309 1.30 ((−1, 1), 108) 3 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
708 — 2837 1.60 ((−1, 1), 140) 4, 5 RLWR ∑ni=0 xi PKE
LightSaber 512 2 8192 2.31 normal 1 MLWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
Saber 768 3 8192 2.31 normal 3 MLWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
FireSaber 1024 4 8192 2.31 normal 5 MLWR xn/k + 1 KEM, PKE
qTESLA 1024 — 8058881 8.49 normal 1 RLWE xn + 1 SIG
2048 — 12681217 8.49 normal 3 RLWE xn + 1 SIG
2048 — 27627521 8.49 normal 5 RLWE xn + 1 SIG
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Name n k q σ Secret dist. NIST Assumption φ Primitive
Titanium.PKE 1024 — 86017 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
1280 — 301057 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
1536 — 737281 1.41 normal 3 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
2048 — 1198081 1.41 normal 5 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * PKE
Titanium.KEM 1024 — 118273 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
1280 — 430081 1.41 normal 1 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
1536 — 783361 1.41 normal 3 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
2048 — 1198081 1.41 normal 5 PLWE xn +
∑n−1
i=1 fix
i + f0 * KEM
Table 3: Parameter sets for LWE-based schemes with secret dimension n, MLWE
rank k (if any), modulo q, standard deviation of the error σ. If the LWE sam-
ples come from a Ring- or Modulo-LWE instance, the ring is Zq [x]/(φ). The NIST
column indicates the NIST security category aimed at. *For Titanium no ring is
explicitly chosen but the scheme simultaneously relies on a family of rings where
fi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, f0 ∈ {−1, 1}. †For R EMBLEM we list the parameters from the
reference implementation since a suitable φ could not be found for those proposed
in [SPL+17, Table 2].
4 Costing lattice reduction
A variety of approaches are available in the literature to cost the running time
of BKZ, e.g. [CN11,APS15,ADPS16]. The main differences between models are
whether they are in the sieving or enumeration regime, and how many calls to the
SVP oracle are expected to recover a vector of length ≈ δd Vol(Λ)1/d. A summary
of every cost model considered as part of a submission can be found in Table 4.
The most commonly considered SVP oracle is sieving. In the literature, its cost
on a random lattice of dimension β is estimated as 2cβ+o(β), where c = 0.292 clas-
sically [BDGL16], with Grover speedups lowering this to c = 0.265 [Laa15a].
A “paranoid” lower bound is given in [ADPS16] as 20.2075β+o(β) based on
the “kissing number”. Some authors replace o(β) by a constant based on ex-
periments in [Laa15b], some authors omit it. Alternatively, enumeration is
considered in some submissions. In particular, it can be found estimated as
2c1β log β+c2β+c3 [Kan83,MW15] or as 2c1β
2+c2β+c3 [FP85,CN11], with Grover
speedups considered to half the exponent.
With respect to the number of SVP oracle calls required by BKZ, a popular choice
was to follow the “Core-SVP” model introduced in [ADPS16], that considers a
single call. Alternatively, the number of calls has also been estimated to be β (for
example, in [BCD+16]) or 8d (for example, in [Alb17]), where d is the dimension
of the embedding lattice and β is the BKZ block size.
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To simplify the identification of every model, we denote models making a single
call to the SVP oracle as “Core-”, while those making N calls as “N -”. We
use “Sieve” to refer to the sieving oracle (adding “+O(1)” if a constant fac-
tor is included), and “Enum” for enumeration. Finally, if a model considers
Grover speedups, we prepend “Q-”. For example, using this notation, the CRYS-
TALS [LDK+17,SAB+17] submissions consider the Core-Sieve and Q-Core-Sieve
cost models, while qTESLA [BAA+17] considers Q-8d-Sieve+O(1).
LOTUS [PHAM17] is the only submission not to provide a closed formula for
estimating the cost of BKZ. Given their preference for enumeration, we fit their
estimated cost model to a curve of shape 2c1β log β+c2β+c3 , suggesting their model
to be a form of Core-Enum.
The NTRU Prime submission [BCLvV17] utilises the BKZ 2.0 simulator of [CN11]
to determine the necessary block size and number of tours to achieve a certain
root Hermite factor prior to applying their BKZ cost model. In contrast, we apply
the asymptotic formula from [Che13] to relate block size and root Hermite factor,
and consider BKZ to complete in 8 tours while matching their cost asymptotic
for a single Enumeration call.
5 Estimates
For our experiments we make use of the LWE estimator5 from [APS15], which
allows one to specify arbitrary cost models for BKZ. We wrap it in a script
that loops though the proposed schemes and cost models, estimating the cost of
the appropriate variants of the primal and dual lattice attacks. As mentioned
previously, for every LWE-based scheme we estimate each attack twice; using
n and 2n available samples. Our code is available at https://github.com/
estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.
Our results are given in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in Appendix A. A human
friendly version of these tables is available at https://estimate-all-the-lwe-ntru-schemes.
github.io. In particular, the HTML version supports filtering and sorting the
table. It also contains SageMath source code snippets to reproduce each entry.
In the following, we illuminate some of the choices and assumptions we made to
arrive at our estimates.
Error distributions. While the estimator assumes the distribution of error
vector components to be a discrete Gaussian, many submissions use alternatives.
Binomial distributions are treated as discrete Gaussians with the corresponding






































Ding Key Exchange [DTGW17]
EMBLEM [SPL+17]
Q-8d-Sieve+O(1) 8d 20.265β+16.4 qTESLA [BAA+17]




Q-Core-Enum+O(1) 2(0.187β log β−1.019β+16.1)/2 NTRU HRSS [SHRS17]
8d-Enum (quadratic fit)+O(1) 8d 20.000784β
2+0.366β−0.9 NTRU Prime [BCLvV17]
LOTUS-Enum 20.125β log β−0.755β+2.25 LOTUS [PHAM17]
Table 4. Cost models proposed as part of a PQC NIST submission.
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standard deviation. Similarly, bounded uniform distributions U[a,b] are also treated
as discrete Gaussians with standard deviation,
√
VU[a,b] [ei]. In the case of LWR
rounded continuous uniform error, we use a standard deviation of
√
q2/(12p)2
as is considered in [CPL+17,DKRV17,GMZB+17].
Success probability. The estimator supports defining a target success prob-
ability for both the primal and dual attack. The only proposal we found that
explicitly uses this functionality is LIMA [SAL+17], which chooses to use a target
success probability of 51%. For our estimates we imposed this to be the estima-
tor’s default 99% for all schemes, since it seems to make little to no difference for
the final estimates as amplification in this range is rather cheap.
Known limitations. While the estimator can scale short secret vectors with
entries sampled from a bounded uniform distribution, it does not attempt to
shift secret vectors whose entries have unbalanced bounds to optimise the scal-
ing. Similarly, it does not attempt to guess entries of such secrets to use a
hybrid combinatorial approach. We note, however, that only the KINDI submis-
sion [Ban17] uses such a secret vector distribution. In this case, the deviation
from a distribution centred at zero is small and we thus ignore it.
NTRU. For estimating NTRU-based schemes, we also utilise the LWE estimator
as described here to evaluate the primal attack (and its improvements, i.e. the
simplified hybrid attack) on NTRU. In particular, we cost NTRU as a uSVP
instance but note that when no guessing is performed, the geometry of the
NTRU-lattice can possibly be exploited as in [KF17]. The dual attack is not
considered, as it does not apply. Let (f , g) ∈ Z2n be the secret NTRU vector.
We treat f as the LWE secret and g as the LWE error (or vice versa, as their
roles can be swapped). The LWE secret dimension n is set to the degree of the
NTRU polynomial φ. The standard deviation of the LWE error distribution is
set to ‖g‖ /√n. The LWE modulus q is set to the NTRU modulus. The secret
distribution is set to the distribution of f . We limit the number of LWE samples
to n. The estimator is set to consider the n rotations of g when estimating the
cost of the primal attack on NTRU.
Beyond key recovery. We consider key recovery attacks on all schemes. In
the case of LWE-based schemes, we also consider message recovery attacks by
setting the number of samples to be m = 2n and trying to recover the ephemeral
secret key set as part of key encapsulation. For the NTRU-based submissions,
the authors do not or only briefly consider message recovery attacks and do not
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take them into account when evaluating the security of their schemes. We here,
too, restrict our focus to key recovery attacks on NTRU-based schemes.
In the case of signatures, it is also possible to attempt forgery attacks. All four
lattice-based signatures schemes submitted to the NIST process claim that the
problem of forging a signature is strictly harder than that of recovering the
signing key. In particular Dilithium and pqNTRUsign provide analyses which
explicitly determine that larger BKZ block sizes are required for signature forgery
than key recovery. Falcon argues similarly without giving explicit block sizes and
qTESLA presents a tight reduction in the QROM from the RLWE problem to
signature forgery, in particular from exactly the RLWE problem one would have
to solve to yield the signing key. As such, since one may trivially forge signatures
given possession of the signing key, forgery attacks are not considered further in
their security analyses.
Several complications arise when attempting to estimate the complexity of
signature forgery compared to key recovery. These include the requirement for
a signature forging adversary to satisfy the conditions in the Verify algorithm,
which for the four proposed schemes consists of solving different, sometimes not
well studied, problems, such as the SIS problem in the `∞-norm for Dilithium and
qTESLA and the modular equivalence required between the message and signature
in pqNTRUsign. In attempts to determine how one might straightforwardly
estimate the complexity of signature forgery against the Dilithium and qTESLA
schemes, custom analysis was required which was heavily dependent on the
intricacies of the scheme in question, ruling out a scheme-agnostic approach to
security estimation in the case of signature forgeries.
6 Discussion
Our data highlights that cost models for lattice reduction do not necessarily
preserve the ordering of the schemes under consideration. That is, under one cost
model some scheme A can be considered harder to break than a scheme B, while
under another cost model scheme B appears harder to break.
An example for the schemes EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM was highlighted
in [Ber18]. Consider the EMBLEM parameter set with n = 611 and the uRound2.KEM
parameter set with n = 500. In the Core-Sieve cost model, the cost of the primal
attack for EMBLEM-611 is estimated as 76 bits of security and for uRound2.KEM-
500 as 84 bits. For the same attack in the Core-Enum+O(1) cost model, the cost
is estimated for EMBLEM-611 as 142 bits of security and for uRound2.KEM-500
as 126 bits6. Similar swaps can be observed for several other pairs of schemes
6 Any discrepancies in value from those cited in [Ber18] are due to rounding introduced
to the estimator output since.
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and cost models. In most cases the estimated bit securities of the two schemes
are very close to each other (say, 1–2 bits) and thus a swap of ordering does
not fundamentally alter our understanding of their relative security as these
estimates are typically derived by heuristically searching through the space of
possible parameters and computing with limited precision. In some cases, though,
such as the one highlighted in [Ber18], the differences in security estimates can
be significant. There are two classes of such cases.
Sparse secrets. The first class of cases involves instances with sparse secrets.
The LWE estimator applies hybrid strategies when costing the dual attack
(cf. [Alb17]) and the primal attack. The basic idea is that for a sparse secret,
many of the entries of the secret vector are zero, and hence can be ignored. We
guess τ entries to be zero, and drop the corresponding columns from the attack
lattice. In dropping τ columns from a n-dimensional LWE instance, we obtain a
(n− τ)-dimensional LWE instance with the same secret distribution. On the one
hand, there is a probability of failure when guessing which columns to drop. On
the other hand, the (n− τ)-dimensional LWE instance is easier to solve, and in
particular requires a smaller BKZ blocksize β. The trade-off between running
BKZ on smaller lattices and having to run it multiple times can correspond to
an overall lower expected attack cost. This probability of failure when guessing
secret entries does not depend on the cost model, but rather on the weight and
dimension of the secret, making this kind of attack more effective for very sparse
secrets. In the case of comparing an enumeration cost model versus a sieving one,
we have that the cost of enumeration is fitted as 2Θ(β log β) or 2Θ(β
2) whereas
the cost of sieving is 2Θ(β). The steeper curve for enumeration means that as
we increase τ , and hence decrease β, savings are potentially larger, justifying a
larger number τ of entries guessed. Concretely, the computed optimal guessing
dimension τ can be much larger than in the sieving regime. This phenomenon can
also be observed when comparing two different sieving models or two different
enumeration models.
In Figure 1, we illustrate this for the EMBLEM and uRound2.KEM example.
EMBLEM does not have a sparse secret, while uRound2.KEM does (see Table 3).
For EMBLEM the best guessing dimension, giving the lowest overall cost, is
τ = 0 in both cost models. For uRound2.KEM, we see that the optimal guessing
dimension varies depending on the cost model. In the Core-Sieve cost model, the
lowest overall expected cost is achieved for τ = 1 while in the Core-Enum+O(1)
model the optimal choice is τ = 197.
Dual attack. The second class of cases can be observed for the dual attack. Recall
that the dual attack runs lattice reduction to find a small vector v in the scaled
dual lattice of A and then considers 〈v, b〉 which is short when A, b is an LWE
sample. In more detail, the advantage of distinguishing 〈v, b〉 is ε = exp(−δ2 d ·c0)
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Fig. 1. Estimates of the cost of the primal attack when dropping η columns for the
schemes EMBLEM-611 and uRound2.KEM-500 using cost models Core-Enum+O(1)
and Core-Sieve.
for some constant c0 depending on the instance and with d being the dimension
of the lattice under consideration [LP11]. To amplify this advantage to a constant
advantage, we have to repeat the experiment roughly 1/ε2 times. Thus, the
overall cost of the attack is ≈ C(β)/exp(−δ2 d · c0)2 where C(β) is the cost of
lattice reduction with block size β. In the sieving regime C(β) ≈ 2c1β in the
enumeration regime we have C(β) ≈ βc2β (from enumeration costing 2Θ(β log β)).
For large β we have δ ≈ β1/2β [Che13] (cf. Section 2), and thus we have overall
log costs of roughly c1 β + 2 log2(e)β
d/β c0 resp. c2 β log(β) + 2 log2(e)β
d/β c0.
We wish to minimise both expressions (under the constraint that β ≥ 2) and the
optimal trade-off depends on c0, c1 and c2. In particular, the optimal β in the
sieving regime is not necessarily the optimal β in the enumeration regime.
We stress that while the above discussion gives an account of why our estimates
show the behaviour we observe, it leaves the fundamental question partially
unanswered: how does the security of the schemes considered in this work compare
to one another. As it stands, the answer to this question depends on which
between enumeration and sieving is the correct regime to consider for a given
block size, i.e. from which dimension sieving beats enumeration. Thus, resolving
these questions is a pressing concern.
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Quantum security. In [Nat16], NIST defines five security categories that
schemes should target in the presence of an adversary with access to a quantum
computing device. They furthermore propose as a plausible assumption that
such a device would support a maximum quantum circuit depth MAXDEPTH ≤ 296
(although they do not mention a preferred set of universal gates to consider). Since
concrete designs for large scale quantum computers are still an open research
problem, not all schemes take this limitation into account, and many opt for
using an asymptotic Q- cost model that considers the best known theoretical
Grover speed-up, resulting in overestimates of the adversary’s power.
This use of Q- models introduces a further difficulty when trying to compare
schemes based on the outputs of the [APS15] estimator. For example, the security
definition of Category 1 says that attacks on schemes should be as hard as
AES128 key recovery. Some schemes address this by tuning their parameters to
match a Q- hardness ≥ 2128, in the vein of “128 bit security”. On the other hand,
other schemes claiming the same category match Q- hardness ≥ 264 since key
recovery on AES128 can be considered as a search problem in an unstructured list
of size 2128, which Grover can complete in O(2n/2) time. This results in schemes
with rather different cycle counts and memory usage claiming the same security
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